By Paolo Sartori
The collectivization of agricultural land (1929–1940) was one of the major transformative projects pursued by the USSR both in terms of scale and results. This project entailed the confiscation of privately-owned farmland and its redistribution to peasants organized in large-scale collective farms (kolkhoz). Begun in the winter of 1929–30,[1] the collectivization project is commonly associated with the expropriation of ostensibly wealthy landowners, a process known as "dekulakization" (raskulachivanie, from the Russian kulak, "wealthy peasant").[2] In most of the regions of the USSR, such a process did not unravel smoothly, and it was frequently met by peasant resistance.[3] Food crisis, mass violence, and deportation were the most immediate effects resulting from the creation of collectivized agriculture.[4] Initiated as a project to control the peasant output through a reorganization of the countryside, collectivization embodies the tragedy of Stalinist modernization.[5]
The historiography of the collectivization in the Muslim-majority regions of the USSR has grown considerably over the last decades, and it has been following various interpretive trajectories.[6] Based on the pioneering work of Olivier Roy,[7] however, a consensus has coalesced around the idea that collective farms were "formed on the basis of existing local identities and solidarity groups" and that "this specific community framework permitted prestigious families with a religious pedigree to retain a substantial part of their aura even after losing their economic assets."[8] Indeed, many have noted how across the Caucasus and Central Asia, kolkhozes served as a flexible infrastructure to preserve the integrity of Islamic institutions such as shrines and mosques, especially when the latter existed and operated unofficially.[9] What is more, kolkhozes generated agricultural resources, which could be used for the upkeep of the poor through almsgiving, to finance recognized spiritual authorities by voluntary gifts (ṣadaqa, naḑr)[10] and donations to subsidize the maintenance of religious structures.
With regard to the North Caucasus, in particular, the work of Vladimir Bobrovinikov has shown that, within the precincts of the collective farms, the practice of collecting resources for purposes of charity could go beyond the voluntary and become compulsory.[11] Indeed, Bobrovnikov has suggested that collective farmers adjusted to the disbandment of charitable endowments (awqāf) in 1927 and were thus able to support the poor by enforcing the payment of the zakāt on yearly crops.[12]
But how could anyone persuade his own fellow kolkhozniks to pay the zakāt? After all, there existed a dedicated welfare system in the USSR, which could provide for the poor. We should also remind ourselves that collective farms were state-owned, and so were their crops. So, how could farmers have paid the zakāt on something that was not their property?
The Risāla fī 'l-ʿushr is an Arabic-language treatise penned by Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqushī (d. 1947), which can help us answer these questions. To the best of my knowledge, it survives today only in one manuscript, which was copied in February 1949 by Ghāzī Muḥammad al-Gubdanī (d. 1995) and it is preserved today in library of the mosque of Karabudakhkent, a village situated in a lowland area 40 km south-east of Makhachkala, the capital city of Dagestan.[13] The copy in question was most probably made for Ṣadr al-Dīn Karanaev (1891–1968) in the 1950s, an 'ʿālim who offered religious services to the local community of believers. He not only delivered sermons and performed funerary rituals, but also solemnized Islamic marriages and divorces, and advised the local community on matters of Islamic law (his private collection includes a number of fatwās which he solicited to authorities in Buynaksk and Makhachkala in the 1950s and 1960s).
It is difficult to say why Karanaev was interested in the Risāla fī 'l-ʿushr. After the Second World War, Karabudakhkent became a provincial center (rayonnyi tsentr), and the administrative seat overseeing the activities of three kolkhozes covering a massive agricultural area. One should therefore contemplate the possibility that the output of the kolkhozes lent itself to being used as a resource to subsidize the needy; and the risāla conferred legal legitimacy precisely on such extractive practices.
The treatise, its author tells us, was written "at the request of some brothers" who commissioned him to produce an authoritative opinion "on the compulsory payment of the tithe (ʿushr) from the crops on Caucasian lands, which are sown on behalf of collective farms that aggregate Muslim communities, as well as on lands privately owned by individual Muslims."[14] Thus formulated, the opening section of the risāla suggests that the legal status of farmland from the standpoint of sharīʿa had become a matter of controversy among locals, most probably ever since the inception of the collectivization process. And as we shall see, a reflection on the fiscal status of the produce of the kolkhoz (can the tithe be levied on the latter?) was key to argue that the payment of the zakāt represented a collective duty. I shall return to this equation (compulsory payment of the tithe = compulsory payment of the zakāt) in a moment.
The Archimedean point in al-Aqushī's treatise regarding the payment of the tithe was the clarification of two fundamental issues:
- Are the lands ruled by the unbelievers [i.e., Soviet authorities] Muslim territory (dār al-Islām) or non-Muslim territory (dār al-ḥarb)?
- Do Muslims' ownership rights on a property, either movable or immovable, cease, if such a property is taken away by the oppressors (ẓālimūn), or does it continue?
Taken together these two questions can be reformulated as follows: even if they were subject to expropriations, do Muslims own the crops sown in collective farms and their produce even when in non-Muslim territory?
Here below is how al-Aqushī replied to these questions:
I say, and I trust in Allah for success, [repeating] the words of the major scholar Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī[15] in the Tuḥfat [al-muḥtāj]: "I have seen that al-Rāfiʿī[16] and others have transmitted from the words of the scholars of the madhhab that Muslim territories (dār al-Islām) are divided into three categories: (1) lands inhabited by Muslims; (2) lands conquered by Muslims and left to their inhabitants on condition of the payment of the poll tax (jizya); (3) lands which Muslims used to inhabit but were subsequently taken over by infidels." It follows that, if a land has been recognized as dār al-Islām, it does not become non-Muslim territory (dār al-ḥarb) merely because the power of the infidels has been established on it (see the Tuḥfat [al-muḥtāj], vol. 9, p. 269, […]). Hence those who say that [the payment] of the ʿushr is not obligatory because the land has become the abode of war after the infidels seized it is wrong. And it is reported in [Yūsuf al-Ardabilī's] al-Anwār:[17] "Even if the infidels seized the property of the Muslims, they do not become its rightful owners" (vol. 2, p. 348). In the Minhāj [al-ṭālibīn][18] it is reported: "The property seized by enemies during a war is rightful spoils (ghanīma)." That is, if a property was forcibly taken from a Muslim, it remains his property, and the one to whom it passed - even if through purchase and sale - is obliged to return it to the owner (see Ibn Hajar, p. 244, and the Ḥāshiyat al-Shirwānī, p. 249, for more details). It is also said in the Anwār: "The usurper does not become the owner of the property taken away" (vol. 1, p. 348).[19]
At this point of his argumentation, in a powerful synthesis of the authoritative opinions he collected on the subject, al-Aqushī added:
How can an infidel or apostate become the owner of the property of a Muslim, if in essence the property in the hands of the unbelievers does not belong to them? (See further details the Tuḥfat [al-muḥtāj], vol. 7, p. 129).[20]
And in the Minhāj [al-ṭālibīn], it is also reported that: "The [payment of] zakāt is obligatory also on stolen property. However, its payment is delayed until [the stolen property] is returned to the owner. In the Anwār (p. 126) it is reported that: "If anyone has taken wheat by force and sown a field with it, he is obliged to pay the ʿushr. That is, the payment of the ʿushr from the crop is mandatory for the owner himself and not for the one who took away the grain by force, because the harvest obtained belongs to the owner,[21] and not to the one who took away [the grain].[22]
Further, al-Aqushī noted that the change in political sovereignty or external control over the territory does not absolve Muslims from their religious duties, including zakāt. While defending this argument, he critically engaged with and refuted several juristic opinions that claimed that the payment of the zakāt was not obligatory on account of the impurity of the produce originating from stolen or confiscated seed:
These texts, which are like gems, refute the opinion of those who claim that it is not obligatory to pay ʿushr from seized and mixed property. […] I say: how can wages not be subject to zakāt if they are derived from [a kind of] property which is subject to zakāt?[23]
By speaking of "wages," the author here is referring to the so-called "labor day" (Rus. trudоden'), a conventional unit to measure labor among collective farmers (in use between the 1930s to the mid-1960s); and a trudоden' was paid in kind, i.e., with products grown on the kolkhoz. What is meant in this context, therefore, is that collective farm workers grew crops from grain, including seeds both forcibly taken away and voluntarily given to the collective farms. The resulting crop, in the author's opinion, represented a good liable to taxation because, even if the grain was forcibly confiscated by Soviet authorities, the farmer is still its owner.
Finally, al-Aqushī categorically refutes the argument whereby personal hardships or fear of political persecution could exempt someone from the payment of the zakāt. He regards such reasoning as weak and unsubstantiated, asserting that, as a pillar of Islam, the payment of the zakāt remains mandatory in all viable circumstances. Drawing analogies from legal texts regarding mixed or usurped property, he insists that even if the land or seed was initially taken unjustly, the resulting agricultural yield remains to be paid as zakāt. He also argues that collective ownership or cooperative farming models (like kolkhozes) do not eliminate individual responsibilities, provided that the individual share of yield is identifiable.[24]
Let the one who is not stingy himself and does not encourage others to be stingy give what he owes even if his possessions are small. But the love of the people of our time for their wealth has blinded them, that is, they are no longer able to discern the truth, and it has also made them deaf to what would benefit them in their religion. They follow the devil's lead and neglect their faith, and the devil tells them, "Your property has been taken from you by force and injustice, so how can you pay the zakāt on it?" See this in the book al-Zawājir in chapter 131 where it is reported as follows: "As for what they (i.e., Muslims) have done unjustly (i.e., violating the obligations imposed on them by Allah—the payment of zakāt), how can their good deeds be accounted for and [how can] their degrees [of piety] be elevated, if they do not pay the zakat . . . " and so on.[25]
The concluding section of the Risāla fī 'l-ʿushr addresses all Muslims in the North Caucasus and exhorts them to follow the path of the sharīʿa and pay the zakāt. If workers in the collective farms claim to be Muslims, they must pay the zakāt then, so he admonishes his readers. In a virtuoso performance of Islamic erudition, al-Aqushī here waves his forceful exhortation to pay the zakāt together with Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic ḥadīths:
And so, a reasonable man should not abandon any of the duties assigned to him by Allah the Almighty, for they are the distinguishing marks of those who truly belong to Islam, those who have been honored to be separated from those who worship idols. He who has chosen Islam as his religion never ceases to strive for everything that strengthens his faith and helps those who endeavor to elevate the word of truth. O scholars and righteous men! May Allah awaken our hearts and your hearts from the sleep of carelessness! May He grant us and you success in doing good deeds, leaving the reprehensible, fulfilling duties, and paying the zakāt. Do not add to your losses with new losses, lest you also bear the burden of other people's sins. Do not reject my exhortation, but rather heed the admonition which the Messenger gave you when he said: "Speak the truth even if it is bitter."[26] And it is narrated in a ḥadīth: "The two pillars of society are the scholars and the rulers: if they are pious, the whole nation will become pious."[27] O Allah, remove from us the veil [of ignorance], and lead us to the truth and the right path! But in spite of all this, some still claim that they are the sincere ones. But if they had spoken the truth, they would have obeyed the commands and prohibitions of Allah. And if they had obeyed, they would not have refused [to pay] the zakāt. O scholars! "Enter Islam wholeheartedly and do not follow in the footsteps of the devil."[28] Do not let your false opinion about the alleged non-obligation of zakāt in our times mislead you. "Surely, he [Satan] is your clear enemy. "If you falter after receiving clear proofs"[29] about the obligatory [payment of] the zakāt, "then know that Allah is indeed Almighty, All-Wise,"[30] and nothing can keep Him from [delivering his] punishment. Peace be upon all the righteous believers and pious scholars! O Allah, make us from among those who listen to the guidance and follow the best of it. Praise be to Allah who has guided us to do so. And we would not have been guided if Allah had not guided us in His way. Peace and blessings be upon His Messenger Muhammad, his family and all his companions. Amen.[31]
Notes:
[1] The collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union ended at different times, especially in those regions which had been under German occupation during the Second World War.
[2] Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Lynn Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[3] Jeronim Perović, "Highland Rebels: The North Caucasus During the Stalinist Collectivization Campaign," Journal of Contemporary History 51 (2016): 234–60; Adrienne Edgar, A Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), ch. 7.
[4] Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
[5] Lynn Viola, V.P. Danilov, N.A. Ivnitskii and D. Kozlov, The War Against the Peasantry 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside, trans. Steven Shabad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Andrea Graziosi, "The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a New Interpretation Possible, and What Would Its Consequences Be?," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 27 (2004–2005): 97–115.
[6] See, for example, Isabelle Ohayon et Nicolas Werth, La sédentarisation des Kazakhs dans l'URSS de Staline: Collectivisation et changement social (1928–1945) (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2006); Marianne Kamp and Niccolò Pianciola, "Collectivisation, Sedentarisation and Famine in Central Asia," in Routledge Handbook of Central Asia, ed. Rico Isaacs and Erica Marat (London: Routledge, 2021), 41–55; Niccolò Pianciola, "The Collectivisation Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931-1933," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 25 (2001): 237–51; Marianne Kamp, Collectivization Generation: Oral Histories of a Social Revolution in Uzbekistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024).
[7] Olivier Roy, "Ethnies et politique en Asie Centrale," Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée 59–60 (1991): 17–36.
[8] Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Christian Noack, eds., Allah's Kolkhozes: Migration, De-Stalinisation, Privatisation, and the New Muslim Congregations in the Soviet Realm (1950s-2000s) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2014), 16. See further the introduction to this edited volume for an insightful review of existing scholarship. See also Allen J. Frank, Gulag Miracles: Sufis and Stalinist Repression in Kazakhstan (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2019).
[9] Allah's Kolkhozes, passim; Paolo Sartori, A Soviet Sultanate: Islam in Socialist Uzbekistan, 1943–1991 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2024), 276–85.
[10] Ariane Zevaco, "From Old to New Macha: Mass Resettlement and the Redefinition of Islamic Practice
between Tajikistan's Upper Valleys and Cotton Lowlands," in Allah's Kolkhozes, 176–78.
[11] Vladimir Bobrovnikov, "Withering Heights: The Re-Islamisation of a Kolkhoz Village in Dagestan: A Micro-History," in Allah's Kolkhozes, 367–97.
[12] Ibid., 382.
[13] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fi 'l-ʿushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 83.
[14] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fi 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fol. 1a.
[15] Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī al-Makkī (d. 973/1565) authored over sixty works across various fields. His legal writings, Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj and Fatāwā, have been (and continue to be) among the most authoritative sources on Shāfiʿī jurisprudence in Dagestan.
[16] Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al-Rāfiʿī (d. 623/1226) was one of the prominent Shāfiʿī jurists of the later classical period. He received his education from leading scholars of his time, including disciples of Imām al-Ghazālī and other authorities of the Shāfiʿī school. His work al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr, a commentary on al-Ghazālī's al-Wajīz, was widely disseminated in Dagestan and is regarded as one of the principal texts in the Shāfiʿī legal tradition.
[17] Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm al-Ardabīlī al-Shāfiʿī (d. ca. 799/1397) was a prominent Shāfiʿī scholar from Ardabīl (in present-day Iran) and served as the leading authority (shaykh) of jurists in Iranian Azerbaijan. He received his education from various scholars in Marāgha, Tabrīz, and Qazvīn. Al-Ardabīlī was a follower and continuer of the legal methodology of Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Rāfiʿī. His legal treatise al-Anwār li-Aʿmāl al-Abrār has circulated widely in Dagestan until the early 19th century.
[19] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fī 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fols. 1a–1b.
[20] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fī 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fol. 2a.
[21] That is, if one forcibly took the grain away from someone else and sowed a crop with that grain, the entire crop will belong to the latter, i.e., the original owner of the grain.
[22] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fī 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fol. 2b. Clearly, the expression "the one who took away [the grain]" means in this context the kolkhoz administration, i.e., the Soviet state.
[23] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fī 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fol. 4b.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Muḥammad b. Dāwūd Ḥājjī al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fī 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fol. 5a.
[26] Abū Khātim Muḥammad b. Ḥibbān al-Bustī, Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān bi-tartīb Ibn Bulbān (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1993), vol. 1, 361.
[27] Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ʿAmr al-Bazzār, Musnad al-Bazzār (Medina: Maktabat al-'ilmiyya, 2000), vol. 1, 18.
[28] Qurʾān 2:208.
[29] Qurʾān 2:208–209.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Muḥammad b. Dāwud Ḥājji al-Aqūshī al-Naskentī, Risāla fī 'l-'ushr, MS Karabudakhkent, Mosque Collection, inv. no. 91, fol. 5b.
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